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Abstract
In this paper I will introduce a microfounded model of political ac-
tivities. The aim is twofold: rst of all, lling an existing gap with the
actual literature which still lacks of a theoretical explanation about
how voters choose their leisure acitivities in particular those related
with Politics; secondly, explaining why the old may have an interest to
spend a greater amount of their leisure in political activities than the
young. Empirical evidence taken by the British Election Suvery, con-
rm the hipothesis: political acitivism is related to age (although other
individual characteristics, such as gender and education contribute to
increase the explanatory power of regressions) and the old follow di¤er-
ent activities in order to lobby politicians. Finally the paper represents
an empirical proof for the Single Mindedness Theory of Social Secu-
rity Systems, which states that since the old have a natural preference
for leisure, they have to nd a nancial coverage for the reduction in
labour income due to their decision to early retire or to reduce their
labour supply.
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1 Introduction
Which fraction of leisure time is devoted by individuals to political activities?
And to which extent are they prone to substitute their leisure devoted to
political activities with leisure devoted to other kind of activities. To the
best of my knowledge, a microeconomic analysis which is able to answer to
these two questions have not found any place in the economic literature yet.
Nevertheless, over the last years the literature about how individuals spend
their leisure time has been increased.
Of course, the pioneer in the microeconomic analysis of the allocation
of time is Gary Becker. In his A Theory of the Allocation of Time [2]
he assumed that households produce commodities by combining inputs of
goods and time in order to minimize a cost function. He called "full in-
come" the sum of money income and income lost by the use of time. Then,
Beckers great intuition was to assign time with an economic value in terms
of cost-opportunity. To the best of my knowledge the microeconomic foun-
dation of political activities has never nd place in the classic literature.
For political activities I will mean all of those kind of activities which indi-
viduals undertake in order to contact politcians and lobby them as to gain
an economical-political advantage. The set of this activities encompasses
lobbying, telephone calls, e-mails, letters and so on. Furthermore, I will
introduce a foundamental assumption: I will argue that the old spend more
time in political acitivities than what the young do and this is due to two
factors: the rst one is that since the old are retired or have reduced their
labour supply, they have more leisure time in absolute terms; secondly there
is a sort of substitution e¤ect, since they prefer to substitute other types
of leisure activities with political activities because they have a necessity
to lobbying politicians in order to nd a nacne to their reduced labour
income. For insance, if we asssume that wages are paid in the labour mar-
ket according to the production level and we assume that the old are less
productive than the young, we may also expect that the old are less paid
than the young; this situation, exacerbated by the fact that the old have
a natural (biological) preference for leisure, forces them to work less; but
working less means less labour income; they found into the necessity to nd
a nancial coverage to the reduced amount of money they earned when they
were employeed. Nevertheless, even though the political acitivity has never
nd a place within the classic microeconomic analysis, we have examples
of econometric evidence which show that the level of enrollment in these
activities di¤ers with respect to the variable age.
Goerres [5] analysed surveys and interviews in the U.K. explaining why
older people should be any di¤erent from younger people in protests. Al-
though he tried to introduce a theoretical framework in which the absence
of participation is motivated by three lacks (motivation, resources and op-
portunities) a real microeconomic model was not provided. Nevertheless,
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the empirical evidence is interesting. Regressions results state that age is
statistically signicant and assumes a curvilinear specication.
In this paper I will introduce a microfounded model of political activities.
The aim is twofold: rst of all, lling an existing gap with the actual liter-
ature which still lacks of a theoretical explanation about how voters choose
their leisure activities in particular those related with Politics; secondly, ex-
plaining why the old may have an interest to spend a greater amount of
their leisure in political activities than the young. Empirical evidence taken
by the British Election Suvery, conrm the hypothesis: political activism
is related to age (although other individual characteristics, such as gender
and education contribute to increase the explanatory power of regressions)
and the old follow di¤erent activities in order to lobby politicians. Finally
the paper represents an empirical proof for the Single Mindedness Theory
of Social Security Systems, which states that since the old have a natural
preference for leisure, they have to nd a nancial coverage for the reduc-
tion in labour income due to their decision to early retire or to reduce their
labour supply.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the microfoundation
of the theory, section three presets the duality characterization of the model,
section four suggests possible to way to measure welfare changes, section ve
shows empirical evidence and section six concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The old and the young have the same amount of leisure
Suppose that the individual satisfaction derives from the availability of time.
I will divide the total leisure time in time devoted to political activities,
say tp, and time devoted to all of the other activities, say t p. The rst
summarizes all of those activities which an individual undertake and deal
with Politics: amongst them are lobbying, participation in political parties
congresses, conferences, meetings and many others. The residual activities
encompass all of the other activities are possible to imagine. Individual
preferences are captured by a utility function which may be written as:
U i = U(tip; t
i
 p) (1)
I assume that this utility function satises some axioms, such as: con-
tinuity, twice continuously, di¤erentiability and strong non-satiation which
entails that Ulp > 0 and Ul p > 0. A map of indi¤erent curves may be
written as:
U [tip(t
i
 p); t
i
 p] = Sk (2)
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where Sk represents a possible utility level. Figure 1 show the map.
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
Di¤erentiating (2) with respect to t p we may obtain the slope of the
indi¤erent curve, which is:
ti0p (t
i
 p) =  
Uh
 p
[tip(t
i
 p); t
i
 p]
Uhp [t
i
p(t
i
 p); t
i
 p]
(3)
always negative.
Furthermore, indi¤erence curves are convex; a necessary and su¢cient
condition which assure the convexity is:
0 Utp Ut p
Utp Utptp Utpt p
Ut
 p
Utpt p Ut pt p
 > 0 (4)
Obviously an individual cannot use an innite amount of time. Thus, I
will denote T the total amount of leisure time which may be used either to
undertake political activities or to undertake other activities. As a conse-
quence, the time budget constraint may be written as:
CT = cpt
i
p + c pt
i
 p (5)
where CT is the total economic value of time spent in leisure activities
and cp is the cost an individual su¤ers to undertake those activities.
This cost encompasses the cost of travelling to follow political events,
the cost of phone calls, mails, to advertise and promote candidates
and so on. I will also take t p as the numeraire and thus c p will be
normalized to unity and so will C: Initially, I will suppose that both
the old and the young are endowed with the same amount of leisure
time. The maximization problem may be written as follow:
maxU i = U(tip; t
i
 p)
subject to:
T  cpt
i
p + t
i
 p
Nevertheless, by the meaning of the non-satiation axiom it is easy
to argue that a solution where T < cpt
i
p + t
i
 p is not achievable and
thus the the constraint must bind. To solve the problem I write the
Lagrangian function:
L = U(tip; t
i
 p) + (T   cpt
i
p   t
i
 p) (6)
where  represents the Lagrangian multiplier. I write the rst order
condition:
Ltip = Utp(
btip; cti p)  cpb = 0 (7)
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Lti
 p
= Ut
 p
(btip; cti
 
p) 
b = 0 (8)
L = T = cp
btip + cti p (9)
where (btip; cti p) represent the couple of Marshallian demand function
for leisure activities which maximize the individuals utility. From (7)
and (8) we obtain:
b = Utip(btip; cti p)
cp
= Uti
 p
(btip; cti p) (10)
and nally:
cp =
Uti
 p
(btip; cti p)
Utip(
btip; cti p) (11)
where the RHS of the expression represents the marginal rate of substi-
tution of time spend in political activities, tip, for time spent in all the
other activities, ti p. The main assumption of the Single Mindedness
Theory states that, within an economy divided in young and old work-
ers, the old spend more time in political activities (see Canegrati). As
a possible example, I assume that time-preferences of individuals are
represented by a Cobb-Douglas function, which for a representative
old may be written as:
Uo = to 
o
p t
o1  o
 p (12)
with  o > 12 indicating the preferences of the old for political activities.
I write the budget constraint:
cpt
o
p + t
o
 p = T (13)
and maximizing (12) under (13) we obtain the Marshallian demand
function for time spent in political activities:
btop =  oTc1 (14)
and for time spent in other activities:
cto
 p = (1   
o)T (15)
and the Indirect Utility Function
cUo =  oT
c1
 o
((1   o)T )1  
o
(16)
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It can be easily seen that this expression is an increasing function of
both the individuals preferences for time spend in political activities and
the total cost of time and it is a decreasing function of the marginal cost
necessary to undertake these activities. I do the same for the young worker,
writing the utility function:
Uy = ty 
y
p t
y1  y
 p (17)
this time with  y < 12 , and the budget constraint
cpt
y
p + t
y
 p = T (18)
the Marshallian demand function for time spent in political activities:
btyp =  yT
c1
(19)
the Marshallian demand function for time spent in other activities:
cty
 p =  
yT (20)
and the Indirect Utility Function:
cUy =  yT
c1
 y
((1   y)T )1  
y
(21)
Comparing (14) with (19) it is possible to see that, ceteris paribus, typ >
top .
2.2 The old have a greater amount of leisure
Until now, I have assumed that the old and the young were endowed with
the same amount of leisure. This assumption is quite at odds with the
real world, where the old have usually a greater amount of leisure than the
young, due to the fact that they are retired, or their labour supply has been
reduced. Under this assumption I can write a new budget constraint:
cpt
i
p + t
i
 p = T
i (22)
where T iindicates the total amount of leisure time for the group, where
T o > T y. Solving the new maximization problem, we obtain the new Mar-
shallian demand functions, which are:
btop =  oT oc1 (23)
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cto
 p = (1   
o)T o (24)
for the old, and
btyp =  yT y
c1
(25)
cty
 p = (1   
y)T y (26)
for the young. Again, comparing (23) with (25) we can see that all the
more so the level of time spent in political activities is greater for the old
than for the young.
3 A dual approach
In order to analyse more in depth the microeconomic approach to the use of
leisure time by households we want to microfound the e¤ect of a change in
relative prices of various leisure activities and a change in the total amount
of leisure time. For this purpose I will introduce the Hicksian (compensated)
leisure demand function. Suppose now that an individual is willing to mini-
mize his total cost of leisure time necessary to enable him to attain an utility
level U . We can write this new problem in the following manner:
minT i (27)
subject to
U(tip; t
i
 p)  U (28)
Of course in equilibrium (28) must be binding and the Lagrangian func-
tion may be written as:
L = cpt
i
p + t
i
 p   (U(t
i
p; t
i
 p) 
U) (29)
which gives us the following rst order conditions
Ltip = cp   Utp(
etip; fti
 
p)e = 0 (30)
Lti
 p
= 1  Ut
 p
(etip; fti
 
p)e = 0 (31)
L = U(t
i
p; t
i
 p) =
U (32)
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where (etip; fti
 
p) represent the couple of Hicksian (compensated) demand func-
tion for leisure activities which minimize the individuals total cost for leisure
activities. From (30) and (31) we obtain:
 =
Utip(
etip; fti p)
cp
= Uti
 p
(etip; fti p) (33)
and nally:
cp =
Uti
 p
(etip; fti p)
Utip(
etip; fti p) (34)
As an illustrative example we assume again the existence of a Cobb-
Douglas Utility Function such that the minimization problem may be
written as:
min cpt
i
p + t
i
 p (35)
subject to:
ti 
i
p t
i1  i
 p 
U (36)
and solving the problem we obtain the Hicksian demand functions for
political activities
etip =


cp(1  )
1 
U (37)
and for all the other leisure activities
fti
 p =


cp(1  )
 
U (38)
so that the Expenditure Function may be written as:
fT i = cpetip + fti p = cp


cp(1  )
1 
U +


cp(1  )
 
U (39)
From the microeconomic theory we know that if u() is a continuous
function which satises the properties of non-satiation and convexity of pref-
erences % on the consumption set X = R2+ we are able to write the Slutsky
equation in matrix notation:
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Dcet(c; U) = substitution effectDcbt(c; T ) + time effectDTbt(c; T )bt(c; T )> (40)
Furthermore we can also write the Slutsky substitution matrix:
Dcet(c; U) =M(c; T ) =  scpcp(c; T ) scpc p(c; T )sc pcp(c; T ) sc pc p(c; T )

(41)
where sckcz(c; T ) = @
btik(c; T )=@ck
Inspecting (40) We can observe two component: the rst is a pure sub-
stitution e¤ect, which measures how an individual is prone to substitute the
political activity with other leisure activities, whilst the second is a time ef-
fect which measure the e¤ect on the demands once the individual is endowed
with a di¤erent stock of leisure time.
Figure 2 shows the Walrasian (tp) and Hicksian (tph) demand functions
for leisure time spent in political activities.
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
The two functions are equal at the point cp = c

p. Of course the Hicksian
demand function is steeper than the Walrasian function as long as leisure
time spent in political activities is a normal good.
4 Welfare changes
We focus now on the e¤ects that a change in the vector of prices or the
endowment of leisure has on the individuals welfare. I indicate with c0 the
vector of prices before the change and with c1the vector of prices after the
change. Furthermore I will denote with cU i = cU i(c0; T ) the Indirect Utility
Function of the individual before the change and with cU i = cU i(c1; T ) the
Indirect Utility Function of the individual after the change. Finally i will
denote fU i = (c;cU i(c0; T )) the expenditure function before the change and
with fU i = (c;cU i(c1; T )) the expenditure function before the change.
We know that two useful measures of welfare change may be written.
The rst is the Equivalent Variation (EV) whose expression is:
EV (c0; c1; T ) = fU i(c0; U1) fU i(c0; U0) = fU i(c0; U1)  T (42)
or, in another fashion:
EV (c0; c1; T ) =
Z c0p
c1p
etip(cp; c p; U1)dcp (43)
The second is the Compensating Variation (CV), whose expression is:
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CV (c0; c1; T ) = fU i(c1; U1) fU i(c1; U0) = T  fU i(c1; U0) (44)
or:
EV (c0; c1; T ) =
Z c0p
c1p
etip(cp; c p; U0)dcp (45)
5 Empirical Evidence
Our main goal is to evaluate whether the old spend more time in political
activities as suggested by the previous model and whether beliefs about how
politics a¤ects personal situation is di¤erent amongst cohorts. To do this,
rst of all we have to identify a set of political activities which individual
may undertake and which are time-intensive, that is they require a certain
amount of time and resources. I have identied 7 political activities and 1
belief:
 Attempt to persuade other people: this activity refers to all of those
actions which an individual undertakes in order to persuade other in-
dividuals to vote for a certain candidate. These activities require time
spent in talking to other people or advertising ideas of the candidate.
 Support activities: this class of activities encompasses all of those ac-
tivities such as attending a political meeting, putting up campaign
signs and so on.
 Voting : this is of course the most important political activity, since
by this a voter expresses his/her preferences for a certain candidate
in order to elect him/her in the Parliament. In our case we will be
interested only in assessing whether the voter voted in previous elec-
tions (May 5th 2005). Obviously, this activity entails some costs such
as time spent in moving towards the poolling station, the cost of fuel
or transport and so on.
 Time of decision: the activity of take a decision about which candidate
to vote is itself costly, since it takes time away from other "mental"
activities a person may undertake. Notice that in this case this activity
may derive from other activities which help to take the decision, such
as collecting information from the television, radio, newspapers and so
on and the activity of thinking.
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 Contacting politicians: contacting a politician is of course a costly
activity for two reasons: rst of all an individual must spend time
and resources to know a politician and make friends with him and,
secondly he/she has to spend further time and resources to contact
and lobbying him/her (i.e. writing, telephoning and so on).
 Taking part in protests: this is another example of activity which en-
tails time to move towards the protest site and money to organize
protests, such as prompters, placards and so on.
 Working with others who share same concerns: in this case I am re-
ferring to all of those intra-group activities which take place in labour
unions, associations, lobbies where people discuss about strategies, ac-
tions to be undertaken and so on.
 Beliefs about relations between Politics and personal nances: these
creeds refer to how people think governments policies (i.e. taxation,
public goods supply) may a¤ect their nancial situations.
In Appendix I reported questions and the possible answers which al-
lowed me to run regressions
5.1 Data from British Election Survey
The 2005 BES conducted two parallel panel surveys. The core study was a
two-wave face-to-face national probability panel survey, with the rst wave
conducted in February-March 2005 and the second wave conducted in May-
July 2005, starting right after the May 5th general election. The face-to-face
study was complemented by a three-wave internet panel survey. The rst
internet wave was conducted in March 2005; the second wave was imple-
mented during the o¢cial campaign in April 2005, and the third went into
the eld in May 2005, immediately after the election. The pre-election wave
questionnaires in both the face and internet surveys were identical, insofar
as this was possible given that di¤erent modes were involved. The internet
post-election survey was quite short, reecting the fact that the internet re-
spondents had already been interviewed a second time during the campaign.
However, it did include a number of key questions  about turnout and party
choice  that were asked in the more extensive post-election face survey.
In-Person Surveys: As noted above, the 2005 BES in-person pre-election
baseline survey was conducted before the election campaign o¢cially be-
gan. The survey was designed to yield a representative sample of non-
institutionalized adults aged 18 and older living in Great Britain (people
living in Northern Ireland and Scots living north of the Caledonian canal
were excluded). A clustered multi-stage design was employed. First, 128
constituencies were sampled (77 in England, 29 in Scotland and 22 in Wales).
Constituencies were sampled using three stratication criteria: (i) electoral
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marginality in the 2001 general election, (ii) region in England/Scotland and
percent Welsh speakers in Wales, and (iii) population density. Within each
constituency selected, two wards were randomly chosen, and within each
ward household addresses were selected with equal probability from the na-
tional postcode address le. For households with multiple occupants, one
person (the potential respondent) was selected at random using a modied
Kish grid.
The N for the pre-election campaign survey was, 3589, with a response
rate of 60.5%. Beginning immediately after the election, all of the pre-
election respondents were asked to do a second in-person interview. The re-
sulting pre-post panel N was 2959 (panel retention rate = 82.4%). To provide
a representative national post-election sample, the panel was supplemented
by a top-up sample (N = 1202) chosen using the methods described above.
All of the post-election top-up respondents were interviewed in-person. The
unweighted post-election sample N thus was 4161 and, altogether, 4791 re-
spondents participated in one or both of the in-person interviews.
The in-person survey data were weighted using a combination of factors
designed to correct for unequal selection probabilities arising from deliber-
ate oversampling in Scotland andWales, deliberate oversampling of marginal
constituencies, variation in the number of households at selected addresses,
and variation in the number of people living in selected households.7 In ad-
dition, a set of post-stratication or calibration weights for age and gender
were employed.
Internet Surveys: Similar to the in-person pre-election survey, the rst
wave of the internet survey was conducted just before the election campaign
formally began. Potential internet respondents were selected from YouGovs
master panel which included 89,000 people at the time the study was con-
ducted.8 People join the YouGov master panel in one of three ways: (i)
by visiting the YouGov website (www.YouGov.com) and registering; (ii) by
being recruited by one of several professional third-party recruiters (e.g.,
Win4Now) employed by YouGov; (iii) through ad-hoc alliances between
YouGov and partners such as media outlets interested in conducting specic
survey research projects. Respondents in such surveys can be invited to join
the YouGov master panel.
Potential respondents for the BES pre-election baseline internet survey
were randomly selected from subsections of the master panel dened in terms
of demographics (age, gender), media consumption (newspaper readership)
and a political criterion (reported vote in the preceding (2001) general elec-
tion). The total (unweighted) N for the YouGov pre-campaign survey was
7793. During the election campaign 6068 of these respondents participated
in a rolling campaign panel survey designed to track the dynamics of public
opinion as the campaign unfolded. Immediately after the election, 5910 of
the pre-campaign respondents participated in a post-election survey. The
response rate for the initial pre-campaign survey was 52.0%, and panel reten-
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tion rates were 77.9% (campaign survey), and 75.8% (post-election survey).
After the three waves of the internet survey were completed, post-stratication
weights for the data were developed using demographic criteria (gender, age
within gender, region and social class), as well as newspaper readership
and vote in the 2001 general election. Similar to the in-person surveys, in-
formation from the 2001 UK census was used to develop the demographic
weighting factors for the internet surveys. Data from the National Read-
ership Survey (an annual random probability in-person survey with 34,000
respondents) were used to construct the newspaper readership weighting fac-
tor, and the past vote weighting factor was developed based on the results
of a large in-house analysis of false-memory e¤ects.
5.2 Econometric Framework
Our main goal is to assess whether it is true that the old spend more time
in political activities rather than the young. The BES contains a subset of
variables which enables us to perform some LOGIT regressions. I will adopt
two di¤erent specication of the model. The rst is
political activityj = 0j + 1jage+ 2jgender + 3jeducatio+ #j
where fjg81 represents the set of possible political activities. This speci-
cation says that the j-th political activity depends on age of the individual,
his/her gender and his/her level of education. If our assumptions was true
we should expect that 1j is statistically signicant. the sign of the parame-
ter should change related to the scale which measure the political activity,
but this relations should always brings us to the conclusion that the old
spend more time in that activity than the young.
In the second specication of the model I try to assess whether there
are some other variables which may inuence results. In particular one
may think that undertaking political activities may depend on the environ-
ment an individual lives in. This is way I will use the membership to some
groups such as labour unions, Trade union, Business or employers associ-
ation, Farmers association or Professional association as a proxy to assess
the role of the environment on political activities. The new specication of
the model is:
political activityj = 0j + 1jage+ 2jgender + 3jeducatio
+4jbelong_trade_union+ 5jbelong_business_employers
+6jbelong_farmers+ 7jbelong_professional_association+ #j
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According to Canegrati, we should expect that the membership to a
labour unions play an important role in undertaking political actions and so
we expect that 4j is statistically signicant.
I performed regressions using LOGIT models, with Robust Standard
Errors (Results are reported in Table 1-8). The choice of LOGIT models
naturally arises if we consider that the response variable is the left-right scale
which is treated as ordinal, since a political scale has a natural ordering
(left to right), even though the distances between adjacent levels are not
quantiable. In these models, an underlying score has been estimated as a
linear function of the regressors and a set of "cut points". The probability
of observing an outcome equal to o corresponds to the probability that the
estimated linear function and an error term lies within an interval delimited
by the estimated cut points. For instance, the probability that a responder
i nds himself/herself at the fourth level of the left-right scale is equal to:
Pr(leveli = o) = Pr(ho 1 < 1x1i + :::+ hxhi + vi  hi)
where vi is assumed to be distributed according to a LOGIT distribution
= 11=exp( ho+
P
hxh)
  11=exp( ho 1+
P
hxh)
Thus the estimations outcomes consists both in a set of h coe¢cients
and in a set of O   1 cut points, with O equal to the number of possible
outcomes.
5.3 Main Findings
First of all, for every question I built a pie chart which reports the per-
centage of respondents for every possible answers (Pie charts 1-8 reported
in the Appendix under the related questions). Table 1-8 report the regres-
sions results. I will describe results relative to di¤erent dependent variables,
interpreting coe¢cients:
 Attempt to persuade other people [table 1]: Age, Gender and Edu-
cation are all statistically signicant at the 1 per cent of the C.I. in
the rst specication, whilst in the second specication Age, Gender,
Education, Labour unions membership are signicant at the 1 per cent
of the C.I., business and professional associations membership at the
5 per cent of the C.I., whilst farmer association membership is not
signicant. A negative coe¢cient means that the expectation of never
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having attempt to persuade other people to vote for a certain candi-
date decreases. Thus, it seems that elder people are more likely to
undertake this persuasion activity, whilst this likelihood decrease if
the individual is a female. Furthermore, members of unions, business
and professional associations seem to increase the same likelihood, de-
noting that those groups have a particular enrolment in the political
activity.
 Support activities [table 2]: Age, Gender and Education are all sta-
tistically signicant at the 1 per cent of the C.I. in the rst speci-
cation, whilst in the second specication Age, Gender, Education,
Labour unions membership are signicant at the 1 per cent of the
C.I., business associations membership at the 5 per cent of the C.I.,
whilst farmer and professional association membership is not signi-
cant. Again, a negative coe¢cient means that the likelihood for this
activity to be undertaken increases, and as consequence, we can say
that an elder, male and member of labour union or business associa-
tion is the representative prototype of individual which undertakes the
activity.
 Voting [table 3]: Age, Gender and Education are all statistically sig-
nicant at the 1 per cent of the C.I. in the rst specication, whilst
in the second specication Age, Gender, Education, Labour unions
membership are signicant at the 1 per cent of the C.I., farmer and
professional association membership at the 5 per cent of the C.I., whilst
business associations membership is not signicant. A negative coef-
cient means that the likelihood to have voted in 2005 elections in-
creases and thus, we can say that an elder, male, member of labour
union, farmer or professional association is more likely to have voted.
 Time of decision [table 4]: Age and Gender are all statistically sig-
nicant at the 1 per cent of the C.I. and Education is statistically
signicant at the 5 per cent of the C.I., in the rst specication, whilst
in the second specication Age and Gender are signicant at the 1 per
cent of the C.I., Education at the 5 per cent of the C.I., whilst Labour
unions, business, farmer and professional associations membership are
not signicant. A negative parameter increases the likelihood that the
decision of vote has been taken long time ago rather than during the
campaign. Thus, this can be seen as a proxy for a "strong minded-
ness" of the vote. Results conrm that an elder, male individual is less
prone to take his decision subjected to the political campaign, whilst
he seems more prone to having decide before the electoral campaign
took place.
 Contacting politicians [table 5]: Education and Age are signicant
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at the 1 per cent of the C.I. whilst Gender is not signicant., in the
rst specication, whilst in the second specication Age, Education,
Labour unions, business and professional associations membership are
signicant at the 1 per cent of the C.I., farmer association membership
at the 5 per cent of the C.I., and Gender is not signicant. A negative
coe¢cient conrms that the individual has more likely contacted a
politician and thus we can conclude that an elder member of whatever
association is more likely to have undertaken this activity.
 Taking part in protests [table 6]: Education is signicant at the 1
per cent of the C.I. whilst Age is statistically signicant at the 10 per
cent and Gender is not signicant., in the rst specication, whilst in
the second specication Age, Education, Labour unions, business and
professional associations membership are signicant at the 1 per cent
of the C.I., and Gender and farmer association membership at the 5
per cent of the C.I. A negative coe¢cient conrms that the individual
has more likely taken part in protests and thus we can conclude that
an elder, male member of whatever association is more likely to have
undertaken this activity.
 Working with others who share same concerns [table 7]: Age is sig-
nicant at the 1 per cent of the C.I. whilst Gender is statistically
signicant at the 10 per cent and Education is not signicant., in the
rst specication, whilst in the second specication Age is signicant
at the 1 per cent of the C.I., Education, business and professional asso-
ciation membership at the 5 per cent of the C.I, Gender at the 10 per
cent and, nally, trade union and farmer association membership is
not signicant. A negative coe¢cient conrms that the individual has
more likely taken part in this line of work and thus we can conclude
that an elder, male member of professional association is more likely
to have undertaken this activity.
 Beliefs about relations between Politics and personal nances [table
8]: Age is signicant at the 1 per cent of the C.I. whilst Gender is
statistically signicant at the 10 per cent and Education is not signif-
icant., in the rst specication, whilst in the second specication Age
is signicant at the 1 per cent of the C.I., Education, business and pro-
fessional associations membership at the 5 per cent of the C.I., Gender
at the 10 per cent whilst labour union farmer association membership
are not signicant.
Finally in tables pseudo R2 are reported together with the cut points.
From these results an unquestionable truth emerges: the old are the
more active group in society. In fact, the variable Age appears as always
statistically signicant (in most of the cases at the 1 per cent of the C.I.) and
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the sign of the parameter suggests that the older the respondent, the higher
the likelihood he takes part into political activities. This is a conrmation
of the Single Mindedness Theorys main assumptions stated in previous the-
oretical works. Since the old are more single-minded in order to have more
leisure, they have to lobby politicians to substitute their labour income with
transfers. For doing this they spend a fraction of their greater amount of
leisure time in lobbying politicians. Furthermore, also the membership to
particular association such as labour unions, business or professional com-
munities and farmers associations play an important role in order to increase
the likelihood of lobbying politician. This is not surprising, since we exactly
expect that individual get together in order to increase their power to obtain
what they require from government.
6 Conclusions
In this paper I tried to provide a possible explanation to the issue of alloca-
tion of time amongst di¤erent political activities. First of all, I provided a
micro-foudation to the problem, suggesting that the total amount of leisure
time may be divided amongst di¤erent type of activities and political activi-
ties belong to these ones. I focused on a dual approach and I considered the
substitution and the "time" e¤ects, whose magnitude drive the way individ-
uals divide their activities amongst political activities and all of the other
activities. Secondly, I demonstrated that the old have a special interest to
substitute the total time spend in other activities with political activities,
since they found into the need to nd a nancial coverage to their leisure
time increased by the fact that they retire early or reduce their amount of
labour supply due to many reasons, rst of all a natural preference for en-
joying leisure. Empirical evidence conrms the main assumption: analysing
the U.K. reality it seems that activism is related to many factors: age, in
primis, gender and education level. This positive results o¤ers also an help
to assess the validity of the Single Mindedness Theory. Of course, future
researches will have more than one incentive to focus on the analysis of po-
litical activities: both the theory and the empirical evidence must nd a
conrmation; especially the second one needs to nd a more robust support
and it would be interesting to analyse the situation in other countries having
similar characteristics to the U.K.
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7 Appendix
1. Talked to other people to persuade them to vote for a particular
party of candidate?
Frequently
Occasionally
Rarely
Never
Dont know
[PIE CHART 1 HERE]
2. Showed your support for a particular party or candidate by,
for example, attending a meeting, putting up campaign signs, or
in some other way?
Frequently
Occasionally
Rarely
Never
Dont know
[PIE CHART 2 HERE]
3. Talking with people about the general election on May 5th,
we have found that a lot of people didnt manage to vote. How
about you, did you manage to vote in the general election?
Yes, I voted
No, I did not vote
[PIE CHART 3 HERE]
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4. Over the past ve years or so, have you done any of the
following things to express your views about something the gov-
ernment should or should not be doing? Contacted a politician or
government o¢cial either in person or in writing, or some other
way?
Yes
No
Dont know
[PIE CHART 4 HERE]
5. Over the past ve years or so, have you done any of the
following things to express your views about something the gov-
ernment should or should not be doing? Taken part in a protest,
march or demonstration?
Yes
No
Dont know
[PIE CHART 5 HERE]
6. Over the past ve years or so, have you done any of the fol-
lowing things to express your views about something the govern-
ment should or should not be doing?Worked together with people
who shared the same concern?
Yes
No
Dont know
[PIE CHART 6 HERE]
7. How much do you think that the governments policies a¤ect
the nancial situation of your household?
A great deal
A fair amount
Not very much
Not at all
Dont know
[PIE CHART 7 HERE]
8. Are you a member of any of the following groups? Please
indicate all groups that you are a member of:
Trade union
Business or employers association
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Farmers association
Professional association
None of these
[PIE CHART 8 HERE]
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 TABLE 1 
(Robust standard errors in parenthesis; (***) significant at 1% of the C.I.; (**) significant at 5% of the C.I.; (*) significant at 10% of 
the C.I.) 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Support activities 
LOGIT (1) LOGIT (2) 
age -.029*** 
(0.000) 
-.029*** 
(0.000) 
gender .244*** 
(0.003) 
.209** 
(0.012) 
educatio -.026*** 
(0.000) 
-.022*** 
(0.006) 
belong_trade union  -.344*** 
(0.001) 
belong_business association  -.523** 
(0.027) 
belong farmer association  -.807 
(0.369) 
belong professional association  -.101 
(0.423) 
   
Number of observations 3207 3207 
Pseudo R2     0.023 0.027 
   
/cut1 -4.180 -4.269 
/cut2 -3.123 -3.209 
/cut3 -2.413 -2.495 
TABLE 2 
(Robust standard errors in parethesis; (***) significant at 1% of the C.I.; (**) significant at 5% of the C.I.; (*) significant at 10% of 
the C.I.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Attempt to persuade other people 
LOGIT (1) LOGIT (2) 
age -.009*** 
(0.000) 
-.008*** 
(0.000) 
gender .664*** 
(0.000) 
.630*** 
(0.000) 
educatio -.029*** 
(0.000) 
-.023*** 
(0.001) 
belong_trade union  -.248*** 
(0.006) 
belong_business association  -.501** 
(0.031) 
belong farmer association  -.612 
(0.306) 
belong professional association  -.224** 
(0.038) 
   
Number of observations 3206 3206 
Pseudo R2     0.018 0.021 
   
/cut1 -2.565 -2.609 
/cut2 -.895 -.930 
/cut3 .015 -.013 
Dependent variable: 
Voting 
LOGIT (1) LOGIT (2) 
Age -.051*** 
(0.000) 
-.050*** 
(0.000) 
Gender .506*** 
(0.000) 
.478*** 
(0.000) 
Education -.059*** 
(0.000) 
-.052*** 
(0.000) 
belong_trade union  -.532*** 
(0.000) 
belong_business association  -.047 
(0.901) 
belong farmer association  1.669** 
(0.016) 
belong professional association  -.354** 
(0.049) 
   
Number of observations 3234 3234 
Pseudo R2     0.087 0.094 
   
/cut1 -.541 -.559 
TABLE 3 
(Robust standard errors in parethesis; (***) significant at 1% of the C.I.; (**) significant at 5% of the C.I.; (*) significant at 10% of 
the C.I.) 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Time of decision 
LOGIT (1) LOGIT (2) 
Age -.011*** 
(0.000) 
-.011*** 
(0.000) 
Gender .195*** 
(0.007) 
.202*** 
(0.006) 
Education .016** 
(0.015) 
.015** 
(0.025) 
belong_trade union  .095 
(0.309) 
belong_business association  -.001 
(0.995) 
belong farmer association  -1.554 
(0.166) 
belong professional association  .047 
(0.685) 
   
Number of observations 2597 2597 
Pseudo R2     0.006 0.007 
   
/cut1 -.346 -.325 
/cut2 .098 .119 
/cut3 .648 .670 
TABLE 4 
(Robust standard errors in parethesis; (***) significant at 1% of the C.I.; (**) significant at 5% of the C.I.; (*) significant at 10% of 
the C.I.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Contacting politicians 
LOGIT (1) LOGIT (2) 
Age -.027*** 
(0.000) 
-.026*** 
(0.000) 
Gender .093 
(0.225) 
.028 
(0.712) 
Education -.057*** 
(0.000) 
-.047*** 
(0.000) 
belong_trade union  -.335*** 
(0.001) 
belong_business association  -.749*** 
(0.003) 
belong farmer association  -2.738** 
(0.018) 
belong professional association  -.438*** 
(0.000) 
   
Number of observations 3188 3188 
Pseudo R2     0.036 0.049 
   
/cut1 -2.441 -2.533 
TABLE 5 
(Robust standard errors in parethesis; (***) significant at 1% of the C.I.; (**) significant at 5% of the C.I.; (*) significant at 10% of 
the C.I.) 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Taking part in protests 
LOGIT (1) LOGIT (2) 
Age .007* 
(0.053) 
-.009*** 
(0.001) 
Gender .086 
(0.441) 
.175** 
(0.04) 
Education -.066*** 
(0.000) 
-.046*** 
(0.000) 
belong_trade union  -.540*** 
(0.000) 
belong_business association  -1.079*** 
(0.000) 
belong farmer association  -2.135** 
(0.033) 
belong professional association  -.415*** 
(0.001) 
   
Number of observations 3188 3188 
Pseudo R2     0.020 0.038 
   
/cut1 -2.344 -2.157 
/cut1  3.496 
TABLE 6 
(Robust standard errors in parethesis; (***) significant at 1% of the C.I.; (**) significant at 5% of the C.I.; (*) significant at 10% of 
the C.I.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
TABLE 7 
(Robust standard errors in parethesis; (***) significant at 1% of the C.I.; (**) significant at 5% of the C.I.; (*) significant at 10% of 
the C.I.) 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Beliefs about relations between Politics and personal finances 
LOGIT (1) LOGIT (2) 
Age -.017*** 
(0.000) 
-.017*** 
(0.000) 
Gender .120* 
(0.083) 
.116* 
(0.093) 
Education .010 
(0.101) 
.013** 
0.049 
belong_trade union  .109 
(0.209) 
belong_business association  .656** 
(0.028) 
belong farmer association  .536 
(0.594) 
belong professional association  -.248** 
(0.019) 
   
Number of observations 3096 3096 
Pseudo R2     0.011 0.013 
   
/cut1 -1.592 -1.557 
/cut2 .911 .953 
/cut3 3.895 3.941 
TABLE 8 
(Robust standard errors in parethesis; (***) significant at 1% of the C.I.; (**) significant at 5% of the C.I.; (*) significant at 10% of 
the C.I.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
Working with others who share same concerns 
LOGIT (1) LOGIT (2) 
Age -.017*** 
(0.000) 
-.017*** 
(0.000) 
Gender .120* 
(0.083) 
.116* 
(0.093) 
Education .010 
(0.101) 
.013** 
0.049 
belong_trade union  .109 
(0.209) 
belong_business association  .656** 
(0.028) 
belong farmer association  .536 
(0.594) 
belong professional association  -.248** 
(0.019) 
   
Number of observations 3096 3096 
Pseudo R2     0.011 0.013 
   
/cut1 -1.592 -1.557 
/cut2 .911 .953 
/cut3 3.895 3.941 
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